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Abstract
An analysis of several important aspects of competition or conflict in
games, social choice and decision theory is presented. Inherent diffi-
culties and complexities in cooperation are highlighted. These have
over the years led to a certain marginalization of studies related to co-
operation. The significant richness of cooperation possibilities and the
considerable gains which my lie there hidden are indicated. Based on
that, a reconsideration of cooperation is suggested, as a more evolved
form of rational behaviour. As one of the motivations it is shown that
the paradigmatic non-cooperative Nash equilibrium itself rests on a
strong cooperation assumption in the case of n ≥ 3 players.
0. Preliminary Remarks
Optimization has a long and important history in human endeavours.
In modern times, a significant moment occurred when the Newtonian
laws of dynamics were found to be expressible by the minimization of
the integrals of corresponding Lagrangeans. This led, as is well known,
to the development of Variational Calculus.
Such minimization, or in general, optimization problems are, how-
ever, particular, and as such, rather simple cases, since they involve
a situation where one single conscious agent, a human for instance, is
facing what is usually called Nature. Indeed, two features are specific
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to such a situation. Nature is supposed to have well set laws which
act constantly and in the same manner, regardless of the possible in-
volvement of the conscious agent. Also, the optimization pursued by
the conscious agent has a clear cut and a priori well defined criterion
according to which is supposed to be accomplished.
Needless to say, there are other, more complex optimization situa-
tions in which several conscious agents may become involved. Here
we list three of such well known situations which, so far, happen to
exhaust a wide range of endeavours in optimization, see Luce & Raiffa.
Games are optimization situations in which two or more conscious
and autonomous agents are involved. A further feature in this case is
that each such agent has a clear cut and a priori well defined criterion
according to which is supposed to act.
Social, collective or group choice is a situation in which one single
conscious agent is supposed to optimize the outcome for two or more
beneficiaries. And again, each such beneficiary is supposed to have
a clear cut and a priori well defined criterion according to which is
supposed to be satisfied.
The third possibility is given by a single decision maker with multiple
and conflicting objectives.
At first sight, it may appear that games are the most difficult to deal
with, since they involve more than one conscious agent. Certainly, as
we shall see, games are not easy to treat in many cases of interest,
and in fact, when approached in sufficient generality, they may lead
to algorithmically unsolvable problems.
However, as it turns out, social, collective or group choice is not a
much simpler venture either, even if there is only one conscious agent
and the criteria which have to be satisfied are clear cut and a priori
well defined. Arrow’s celebrated paradox, mentioned in the sequel,
gives a good measure of the difficulties involved in this regard.
Lastly, the situation of a single decision maker with multiple and con-
flicting objectives is again not trivial, even if in this case he or she is
the single beneficiary which has to be satisfied. Indeed, the main dif-
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ficulty in this case is in the fact that there is no - and in general, there
simply cannot be - a natural, canonical, universal way to aggregate or
synthesize a given set of multiple and conflicting objectives into one
single clear cut criterion.
1. Introduction
As mentioned, there are a number of well known ways interactions, and
in particular, competition or conflict, involving rational autonomous
agents are modelled in mathematics, among them by game theory, so-
cial, collective or group choice theory, and decision theory. Obviously,
such interactions, even when they involve competition or conflict, need
not always or necessarily be totally incompatible with certain forms
of cooperation. And needless to say, it is often that certain convenient
outcomes cannot be obtained in any other ways, except by coopera-
tion.
Game theory, as initiated in its modern and systematic form by John
von Neumann in the late 1920s, see von Neumann & Morgenstern,
centers around the individual rational agent and aims to lead to a
rational outcome when two or more such individuals interact in well
defined situations, and do so, however, without the interference of an
overall arbitrating authority. Social, collective or group choice theory
also starts from individuals, yet its aim is to transcend them to some
extent by aggregating in suitable manners their given preferences, see
Luce & Raiffa, Mirkin.
In a way at the other end of the spectrum involving rational au-
tonomous agents, decision theory aims, among others, to support in
his or her decision one single decision maker who faces a number of con-
flicting objectives, see Luce & Raiffa, Bacharach & Hurley, Rosinger
[1-4]. It follows that decision theory can be seen as variant of a one
person game, in which the player plays against Nature, the difficulty
arising from the presence of several conflicting objectives.
Here we can note that the very development of these mathematical
theories and of the resulting methods is in itself an act of rational be-
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haviour, albeit on a certain meta-level, which involves both the levels
of the interest in developing the general concepts, axioms, theorems,
and so on, as well as the levels at which they are put to their effective
uses in a variety of relevant applications.
And yet, such a meta-rational behaviour appears to have mostly come
to a halt when dealing with cooperation.
Instead, the effort has rather been focused upon non-cooperative con-
texts, and rationality got thus limited to them. A further aggravation
of such a limitation upon rationality has come from the fact that coop-
eration is so often being associated with, or even reduced to issues of
ethics, wisdom, philosophy, or on the contrary, to mere opportunistic
coalitions based on politics, or various other expediencies.
One of the few more prominent contributions to the study of coop-
eration has been the 1984 book of Robert Axelrod, which however is
limited to two person nonzero sum games, and it centers around one
of the simplest nontrivial such examples, namely, the celebrated game
called the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This game was suggested in the early
1950s by Merrill Flood and Melvin Drescher, and then formalized by
Albert W Tucker, see section 3, or Axelrod, Rasmusen.
However, even such simplest nontrivial examples can show that coop-
eration itself is often but a most natural matter of rationality, albeit
manifested in forms which can often be far more evolved than those
encountered in non-cooperation. Indeed, in many non-cooperative sit-
uations what can be obtained by the players involved proves to be
significantly less than what may be available through suitable cooper-
ation. Thus the choice of cooperation need not at all be seen as merely
a matter which has to do with expediency, politics, wisdom, ethics, or
morality. Instead, cooperation proves to be one of the major strategic
assets available in many important situations.
And then the issue is simply the following : do we limit rationality
and stop it before considering cooperation in ways more adequate to
its considerable depth and potential, or instead, are we ready to try
to be rational all the way ?
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And the fact is that very few situations are of a nature in which com-
petition or conflict is total, thus, there cannot be a place for one or
another form of cooperation.
In game theory, for instance, such a situation corresponds to the ex-
treme and simplest case of the two person zero sum game.
In rest, that is, in the vast majority of cases of games, the possibili-
ties for cooperation and its considerable possible rewards are always
there. And then, all it takes is to extend and deepen rationality, and
thus find and develop suitable ways of cooperation. And above all,
to establish a context in which cooperation - which is a purely joint
voluntary matter - can indeed be relied upon.
In this regard it is instructive to see that, contrary to customary per-
ception, even in the celebrated paradigmatic non-cooperative Nash-
equilibrium concept, and the corresponding theorem, a very strong
cooperation assumption is in fact essentially involved, when there are
n ≥ 3 players. And as it turns out, this cooperation assumption is
indeed so strong that it is simply unrealistic in practical situations.
In this way what we face is the alternative :
Non-cooperation : Either we limit rationality and try to use it as
much as possible within the framework of non-cooperation, and only
on occasion, and only as a second choice do we consider and try co-
operation as well.
Or
Cooperation : Within an extended and deeper sense of rationality
we create and maintain a context in which due consideration given to
cooperation can be relied upon. In other words, we are reliably coop-
eration minded.
So far, as will be argued, when it comes to the development of the
respective theories, the first of the above two alternatives has mostly
been taken, even if that may have happened rather by default, that
is, as a consequence of the extreme complexity of the phenomenon of
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cooperation.
However, this limitation of rationality mostly to the study of non-
cooperative games is not in fact securing a significantly simpler or
easier situation. Indeed, as follows from Binmore [1-3], such games
can still lead to complexities which are not algorithmically solvable.
In this way, having mostly avoided what appeared a theoretically dif-
ficult task in the second above alternative, instead of it, the first alter-
native, which in fact is not less difficult, was taken. Certainly, during
the late 1940s and early 1950s when game theory knew a first massive
development, there was not much awareness about the possibility of
the presence of the type of deep difficulties which would more than
three decades later be pointed out by Binmore. On the contrary, dur-
ing that first enthusiastic and major development period it was hoped
that, at last, game theory would offer mankind a theoretical model for
dealing with all possible conflicts among autonomous rational agents.
And that hope was so deeply entrenched that Cold War strategies at
the time were suggested in the USA, based on game theoretical con-
siderations.
One way out, suggested in this study, and at this stage already with
the benefit of knowing about the message of Binmore, is to take the
second above alternative, and do so in the following manner. Now
that it has been revealed that both the non-cooperative and cooper-
ative types of games can be of an extreme complexity from the point
of view of theoretical approaches, the focus can shift from the ear-
lier attempts to construct comprehensive enough theories for either of
them, to finding a framework which is large enough to contain enough
of what is already known and it is important about games, and then,
in such a framework, to develop theories, methods, examples, applica-
tions, and so on, which have their own value and interest, even if they
may fall short of being ultimately or near ultimately comprehensive.
And clearly, once such a shift of focus is found appropriate, the second
alternative is the natural one. Indeed, this second alternative does ob-
viously contain the first one as a particular case. On the other hand,
the first alternative has so far not been proven to contain the second
alternative. This is contrary to the hopes, or claims, of what once had
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been the tempting ”Nash Program”, and which is mentioned in some
more detail later.
Here it should be noted that cooperation is not limited to games alone.
Indeed, in social, collective or group choice, there may similarly exist a
considerable scope for cooperative interaction between the individual
beneficiaries involved, an interaction which can, among others, lead
to a modification of some of their initial individual preferences, and
also to a readiness to accept an aggregations of such preferences which
would otherwise be seen as being less than fair to certain of the indi-
vidual beneficiaries. Such modifications of individual preferences can
be arranged upon suitable side payments, similar to those in game
theory. And in view of the celebrated impossibility result of Kenneth
J Arrow, discovered in 1950, see section 4, such a cooperation may
have the significant merit of being the one possible way to avoid the
necessity of a dictator.
At last, even in the case of one single decision maker, the fact that
he or she faces all alone his or her own conflicting objectives need not
completely rule out the use of certain cooperative type approaches.
After all, cooperation can involve bargaining, and in the case of one
single decision maker with several conflicting objectives, he himself,
or she herself may end up as if bargaining with himself or herself.
In fact, certain forms of cooperation find a most appropriate context
precisely within the thinking of a single decision maker who exhibits
a rational behaviour.
Of course, as mentioned, there are certain particular situations when
cooperation is simply not possible, like for instance, in the two per-
son zero sum games, which in fact are the simplest and most extreme
instance of conflict in game theory. On the other hand, in large vari-
eties of other interactions between autonomous rational agents there
are vast and far from sufficiently explored possibilities for cooperation.
As a rather relevant example in this respect it will be shown in section
2, that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium concept and theorem itself,
which is usually seen as a paradigm of non-cooperation, must in fact
assume, even if somewhat implicitly, a very strong form of cooperation,
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in order to have any practical meaning and value at all in the case of
n ≥ 3 players. And then, paradoxically, the respective cooperation
assumption is so strong that it becomes unrealistic in practice.
Furthermore, the concept of Nash-equilibrium on which this result is
based is highly unstable, or fragile, when there are at least three play-
ers involved, players who are not cooperation minded.
Another important criticism of both the Nash-equilibrium concept and
of the corresponding equilibrium result is that, as is well known, in
case of cooperation, players can often obtain significantly higher pay-
offs than those given by equilibrium strategies, see for instance the
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
However, there is a rather weighty reason, explanation, and maybe
also an excuse, for the fact that meta-rational behaviour has so far
mostly stopped before considering and dealing with cooperation in
ways proportionate to the significant advantages which are often avail-
able, and so far, hidden there. Namely, as is well known even from
common everyday experience, cooperation will often involve consid-
erable complications and difficulties. First of all, and already on its
most basic conceptual levels, cooperation proves to be an extremely
complex and rich phenomenon, which therefore cannot in any way be
encompassed by a few general definitions and mathematical models.
This fact is, indeed, in sharp contrast with the modelling of competi-
tion and conflict situations, where for instance in game theory, the so
called non-cooperative games, see (2.1) and (2.5) below, describe quite
well, and in spite of their manifest simplicity, a considerably large class
of such situations. Second, one can only talk about cooperation if one
can rely on the respective agreements undertaken by the autonomous
agents involved. And the issue of such a reliance clearly depends on
a variety of complex factors which can easily be outside of the realms
of convenient mathematical modelling.
Yet, one should not forget that, just like in the case of competition
and conflict, the primary aspect of cooperation is intent, while the
respective subsequent conceptualizations, models and actions are only
specific instances of manifestation and expression of such an intent.
Therefore, the primary issue is whether we intend to have competition
or conflict in a context which may preferably include cooperation as
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well, or on the contrary, we intend, because of no matter what rea-
sons, to relegate cooperation to a secondary role, or even exclude it
altogether.
And if we do not a priori intend to exclude cooperation, then we should
be careful not to allow that it is excluded merely by default, that is,
due to the fact that it is in general not so easy to deal with it, be
it conceptually, or practically, and then, as a consequence, it simply
happens that we fail, avoid or decline to consider it.
And a readiness to pursue meta-rational behaviour beyond its present
day limits confined mostly to non-cooperation will then suggest that
the intent to cooperate, and even more importantly, the intent to se-
cure and keep up in the longer run a context suitable for cooperation
is but a clearly rational behaviour, even if on a meta-level.
One of the most dramatic and clear cut theoretical manifestations
of the major conceptual difficulties involved related to cooperation is
presented by the mentioned impossibility result of Arrow.
The effect of the presence of such considerable difficulties related to
cooperation has been that the modelling of cooperation has not re-
ceived enough attention, see Axelrod. An aim of this study is to draw
attention upon that fact, and also suggest certain ways to deal with it.
Let us start with a few comments on three of the present day math-
ematical theories which deal with interactions, among them compe-
tition, conflict and possibly cooperation, namely, see Luce & Raiffa,
Rasmusen :
1. cooperative and non-cooperative games,
2. social, collective or group choice,
3. decision support systems for individual decision makers with
conflicting objectives.
Here we can mention that the way the customary division is made be-
tween cooperative and non-cooperative games is in our view not quite
appropriate, as we shall argue in section 2. Indeed, it turns out that
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much of what is nowadays seen as a non-cooperative setup does in
fact rest, even if implicitly, on cooperative assumptions. For instance,
as mentioned earlier, and seen in section 2 in the sequel, the concept
of Nash-equilibrium, and the respective Nash theorem - both seen as
paradigmatic for the non-cooperative games - turn out to be essen-
tially based on a certain very strong cooperative assumption in the
case of n ≥ 3 players.
Such and other similar prominent examples may provide some of the
main points which one can start dealing with related to a reconsider-
ation of cooperation. And they may lead to certain major practical
consequences that may have been missed so far.
In particular, a good deal of what nowadays may be seen as non-
cooperative games could possibly be considered in the cooperative
category, provided that suitable extensions and deepening of the co-
operation concept are employed.
Needless to say, such a view runs against, among others, the mentioned
Nash Program of the early 1950s, see Nash [1,3], which tried to achieve
the opposite, by reducing cooperative games to non-cooperative ones.
Certainly, such a program - or for that matter, one aiming the other
way round - comes quite likely from deeper and more general views
about the nature of possible interaction among autonomous rational
agents, than the views customarily encountered.
As is well known, Nash himself tended to see such interactions as be-
ing mainly moved by competition, conflict, and so on, rather than by
cooperation, see Nasar.
On the other hand, at that time, the older and much more experi-
enced John von Neumann, who was in fact the originator of modern
game theory, considered that there was a major and urgent need in
economics and other important human ventures involving strategic
thinking for the introduction of rational approaches to the respective
variety of human interactions involved. And clearly, the very attempts
to rationalize approaches to competition, conflict, and so on, rather
tend to mollify, than prioritize them. Thus cooperation does not be-
come something to be avoided, but rather to be considered, and made
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use of, whenever possible. Consequently, von Neumann chose to de-
vote a large and important role to various forms of cooperation which,
from theoretical point of view, could be modelled and dealt with at
the time, see Neumann & Morgenstern.
Rather independently during the same period came the famous 1950
paper of Arrow on the impossibility of setting up in general a social
choice function in the absence of a dictator. As we shall see, however,
this and the subsequent related developments in what is nowadays
called social, collective or group choice theory, can naturally be seen
as stressing too much the opposition between cooperation and non-
cooperation, thus leading to a particular and often less than welcome
solution method, namely, the use of a dictator. On the other hand,
by extending and deepening the concept of cooperation one can attain
suitable aggregations of social, collective or group choice, and do so
without the need for dictators.
Let us now mention in short a history of these and related events. A
more detailed history of game theory can be found in Luce & Raiffa,
or Walker, while for a view of the background to group choice and
decisions one can consult Bacharach & Hurley, respectively, Mirkin.
The first major result in game theory was obtained by John von Neu-
mann in his 1928 paper. This is the famous Min-Max theorem about
two player zero sum games. Such games involve the smallest possible
nontrivial number of players, and the most extreme possible conflict
among them, in which what one player wins, the other one must lose,
thus the sum of what is won and lost is always zero. Clearly, in such
a game there is no any way available for cooperation.
Here it is important to note the following. During the period around
1928, when von Neumann was only 25 years old, he was involved in
at least two other major ventures, namely, the foundation of set the-
ory, and the foundation of quantum mechanics. And in both of them
he made most important and lasting contributions. In this way, von
Neumann’s involvement in game theory during that period can be
seen as reflecting the special, if not in fact, fundamental importance
he happened to attribute to it. And indeed, he saw it as being the
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first ever systematic and rigorous theoretical approach to a rational
management of conflict or competition between two or more conscious
agents.
Problems of optimization had been considered earlier as well. After
all, much of the practical human endeavours have always been pursu-
ing one or another from of optimization.
One major example, starting with the 1800s, had been given by vari-
ational calculus which proved to lead to an equivalent formulation of
Newtonian mechanics.
However, such problems could be seen as a game with one single con-
scious and rational player who was playing against Nature.
But now the task facing von Neumann was to be able to build an ap-
propriate theory for conflicts and competitions between two or more
conscious agents, assuming that they were firmly and reliably grounded
in rationality.
It should be remembered in this regard that von Neumann happened
to grow up in the Empire of Austria-Hungary, and did so during the
disastrous years of World War I, and its immediate aftermath. And
just like the well known philosopher Karl Popper, of the same gener-
ation and social background, von Neumann was much influenced by
views dominant in the post World War I years. Views according to
which World War I - called at the time The Great War - was seen as
nothing else but a systematic and catastrophic, even if rather trivial
succession of failures of rationality on the part of the elites running
the Western powers.
The extent to which von Neumann gave a special priority to the de-
velopment of game theory is further illustrated by his activity during
the next one and a half decade, till the publishing in 1944 of his joint
book with Morgenstern, entitled ”Theory of Games and Economic
Behaviour”. Indeed, during the years of World War II, von Neumann
was heavily involved in supporting the American war effort and doing
so in a variety of ways. Consequently, at the time, he did very little
theoretical research. And yet, he considered it important enough to
dedicate time to game theory, and complete the mentioned book of
over 600 pages, which is the first ever systematic and detailed presen-
12
tation of that theory. It should also be mentioned that the theory in
that book is due solely to von Neumann, and most of it, except for his
Min-Max theorem of 1928, was developed by him in the period leading
to its first publication in 1944. Morgenstern was an economist, and his
contribution to the book consisted in the connections between game
theory and economic behaviour. In this way, that book can in fact be
seen as a massive research monograph - and in fact, the first one - in
game theory.
The importance attributed to game theory continued after World War
II as well. And it was due to a good extent to the interest manifested
in it at the RAND Corporation, a most influential California based
think tank at the time, which was heavily involved, among others, in
strategic studies related to the emerging Cold War.
As it happens, Emile Borel initiated in the early 1920s the study of
certain well known card games which were related to the two person
zero sum games. However, he did not obtain the respective major
result, namely, the Min-Max theorem, and in fact, he assumed that
such a theorem was in general false. Later, in 1934, the well known
statistician R A Fisher was also involved in a study of two person zero
sum games, without however obtaining the major Min-Max theorem,
see Luce & Raiffa.
Then starting in 1950, John Nash, who at the time was 22 years old,
published his fundamental papers, Nash [1,3], on equilibrium in n-
person non-cooperative games, and his main result was a significant
and two fold extension of the Min-Max theorem. Indeed, unlike von
Neumann’s Min-Max, Nash managed to show the existence of equilib-
rium not only in the case of two players and a zero sum game, but for
an arbitrary finite number of players, and for games with an arbitrary
sum.
What appeared to be similar with the earlier Min-Max theorem, was
the non-cooperative nature of the result of Nash. That similarity,
however, will be shown to be but illusory, see section 2.
Indeed, von Neumann’s Min-Max theorem being about two players
and with zero sum, it does not have any other chance but to be non-
cooperative.
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On the other hand, both the concept of Nash-equilibrium and the re-
spective Nash theorem are, as mentioned, essentially based on a very
strong cooperative type assumption in the case of n ≥ 3 players.
By the way, here it should be mentioned that Nash also published
important result in cooperative games, Nash [2,4], see section 3.
However, as it happened, his result, which massively extended the
Min-Max theorem to arbitrary number of players and nonzero sum
games, and was later in the 1990 to earn him a Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics, has ever since been seen as essentially belonging to non-
cooperative games.
To a certain extent, such an interpretation is not so surprising due
to the following two facts. First, the Nash result on the existence of
an equilibrium in mixed strategies is an obvious extension of the Min-
Max theorem of von Neumann, and the latter, as mentioned, is indeed
about games which are outside of any possible cooperation. Second,
as long as one is limited to the usual, and thus narrow concepts of
cooperation, the result of Nash will be seen as falling outside of the
cooperative framework.
As we shall show in section 2, however, such an interpretation can
only hold if the usual, and indeed narrow concepts of cooperation are
considered. On the other hand, as the very concept of equilibrium in
the Nash result implies it, that result can have any practical meaning
and value at all, and do so beyond its particular two person zero sum
Min-Max case, only if the respective n ≥ 3 players do accept - even if
implicitly - certain very strong additional common rules of behaviour.
Thus in the case of n ≥ 3 players, they must end up by cooperating
very strongly, even if in ways other, and more deep, than those ac-
cording to the usual views of cooperation.
Indeed, the kind of cooperation needed in order to enable the Nash
equilibrium concept and result to function at all proves to be particu-
larly strong. So strong, in fact, as to render it unrealistic in practice.
Due to the reputation of von Neumann, the interest showed by him
in game theory led in the late 1940s and early 1950s to a considerable
status for that theory among young mathematicians at Princeton, see
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Nasar. That status was further enhanced by results such as those of
Nash and a number of other mathematicians.
There was also at the time a significant interest in game theory out-
side of academe. As mentioned for instance, the influential RAND
Corporation was conducting studies in political and military strategy
which were modelled mathematically by a variety of games.
As it happened, however, soon after, certain major setbacks were ex-
perienced. First, and within game theory itself, was the fact that
in the case of n-person games, even for n ≥ 3 moderately large, there
appeared to be serious conceptual difficulties related to reasonable def-
initions of solution. Indeed, too many such games proved not to have
solutions in the sense of a variety of solution concepts, concepts which
each seemed to be natural, see Luce & Raiffa, Owen, Vorob’ev, Ras-
musen.
Later, the nature and depth of these conceptual difficulties got signifi-
cantly clarified. For instance, in Binmore [1-3] it was shown that there
are no Turing machines which could compute general enough games.
In other words, solving games is not an algorithmically feasible prob-
lem.
The second major trouble came from outside of game theory, and it
is not quite clear whether at the time it was soon enough appreciated
by game theorists themselves, with respect to its possible implications
about the fundamental difficulties in formulating appropriate concepts
of solutions in games. Namely, as mentioned, Arrow showed that a
set of individual preferences cannot in general, and under reasonable
conditions, be aggregated into one joint preference, unless there is a
dictator who can impose such a joint preference.
Strangely enough, this result of Arrow about difficulties in the aggre-
gation of a number of individual preferences was not completely new
or unknown. Indeed, it was in fact extending and deepening the ear-
lier known, so called, Voter’s Paradox, mentioned by the Marquis de
Condorcet, back in 1785, see section 4, or Mirkin.
In subsequent years, following the 1950s, developments in game theory
lost much of their momentum. In more recent years, applications of
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game theory gained the interest of economists, and led to a number of
new developments in economic theory. An indication of such develop-
ments was the founding in 1989 of the journal Games and Economic
Behavior.
At the same time certain studies of competition, conflict, and so on,
were taken up by the developments following Arrow’s fundamental
paper, and leading to social, collective or group choice theory, among
others. In this regard, a considerable literature has been developed.
Decision theory got also involved in such studies involving certain
specific instances of competition, conflict or cooperation, related to
problems of optimization, see Rosinger [1-4].
In games, or in social, collective or group choice one has many au-
tonomous players, participants or agents involved, each of them with
one single objective, namely, to maximize his or her advantage which
usually is defined by a scalar, real valued utility function. And by the
early 1950s it became clear enough that such a situation would not be
easy to handle rationally, even on a conceptual level.
On the other hand, a main objective of decision theory is to enable
one single decision maker who happens to have several different, and
usually, quite strongly conflicting objectives. And in view of Arrow’s
result, such a situation may appear to be more easy to deal with since
the single decision maker can anyhow function as a ”dictator” for him-
self or herself.
Yet as seen in section 6, being even such a special case of ”dictator”
will present its rather difficult problems.
2. The Nash Equilibrium and Theorem
The usual way an n-person non-cooperative game in terms of the play-
ers’ pure strategies is defined is by
(2.1) G = (P, (Si | i ∈ P ), (Hi | i ∈ P ))
Here P is the set of n ≥ 2 players, and for every player i ∈ P , the
16
finite set Si is the set of his or her pure strategies, while Hi : S −→ R
is the payoff of that player. Here we denoted by
(2.2) S =
∏
i∈P Si
the set of all possible aggregate pure strategies s = (si | i ∈ P ) ∈ S
generated by the independent and simultaneous individual strategy
choices si of the players i ∈ P .
The game proceeds as follows. Each player i ∈ P can freely choose
an individual strategy si ∈ Si, thus leading to an aggregate strategy
s = (si | i ∈ P ) ∈ S. At that point, each player i ∈ P receives the
payoff Hi(s), and the game is ended. We assume that each player tries
to maximize his or her payoff.
Remark 1
The usual reason the games in (2.1) are seen as non-cooperative is as
follows. Each of the n ≥ 2 players i ∈ P can completely independently
of any other player in P choose any of his or her available strategies
si ∈ Si. And the only interaction with other players happens on the
level of payoffs, since the payoff function Hi of the player i ∈ P is
defined on the set S of aggregated strategies, thus it can depend on
the strategy choices of the other players.
However, as we shall see in Remarks 2 - 4 below, in the case of n ≥ 3
players, this independence of the players is only apparent, when seen in
the framework the concept of Nash-equilibrium, and the corresponding
celebrated Nash theorem.

Before considering certain concepts of equilibrium, it is useful to intro-
duce some notation. Given an aggregate strategy s = (si | i ∈ P ) ∈ S
and a player j ∈ P , we denote by s−j what remains from s when we
delete sj. In other words s−j = (si | i ∈ P \ {j}). Given now any
s ′j ∈ Sj , we denote by (s−j , s
′
j) the aggregate strategy (ti | i ∈ P ) ∈ S,
where ti = si, for i ∈ P \ {j}, and tj = s
′
j, for i = j.
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For every given player j ∈ P , an obvious concept of best strategy
s∗j ∈ Sj is one which has the equilibrium property that
(2.3) Hj(s−j, s
∗
j) ≥ Hj(s−j, sj), for all s ∈ S, sj ∈ Sj
Indeed, it is obvious that any given player j ∈ P becomes completely
independent of all the other players, if he or she chooses such a best
strategy. However, as it turns out, and is well known, Rasmusen, very
few games of interest have such strategies.
Consequently, each of the players is in general vulnerable to the other
players, and therefore must try to figure out the consequences of all
the possible actions of all the other players.
Furthermore, even when such strategies exist, it can easily happen
that they lead to payoffs which are significantly lower than those that
may be obtained by suitable cooperation. A good example in this
regard is given by game called the Prisoner’s Dilemma, see section 3.
Remark 2
It is precisely due to the mentioned vulnerability of players, which is
typically present in most of the games in (2.1), that there may arise
an interest in cooperation between the players. A further argument
for cooperation comes from the larger payoff individual players may
consequently obtain. A formulation of such a cooperation, however,
must then come in addition to the simple and general structure present
in (2.1), since it is obviously not already contained explicitly in that
structure.

Being obliged to give up in practice on the concept of best strategy
in (2.3), Nash suggested the following alternative concept which obvi-
ously is much weaker.
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Definition ( Nash )
An aggregate strategy s∗ = (s∗i | i ∈ P ) ∈ S is called a Nash-
equilibrium, if no single player j ∈ P has the incentive to change
all alone his or her strategy s∗j ∈ Sj , in other words, if
(2.4) Hj(s
∗) ≥ Hj(s
∗
−j, sj), for all j ∈ P, sj ∈ Sj
Remark 3
Clearly, the Nash-equilibrium only considers the situation when never
more than one single player does at any given time deviate from his
or her respective strategy. Therefore, the Nash-equilibrium concept
is not able to deal with the situation when there are n ≥ 3 players,
and at some moment, more than one of them deviates from his or her
Nash-equilibrium strategy.
Needless to say, this fact renders the concept of Nash-equilibrium un-
realistically particular, and as such, also unstable or fragile.
Furthermore, that assumption has a manifestly, even if somewhat im-
plicitly and subtly, cooperative nature.
Above all, however, the larger the number n ≥ 3 of players, the less
realistic is that assumption in practical cases.
It is obvious, on the other hand, that when there are n ≥ 3 players,
in case at least two players change their Nash-equilibrium strategies,
the game may open up to a large variety of other possibilities in which
some of the players may happen to increase their payoffs.
Therefore, when constrained within the context of the Nash-equilibrium
concept, the game becomes cooperative by necessity, since the follow-
ing dichotomy opens up inevitably :
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Either
• (C1) All the players agree that never more than one single
player may change his or her Nash-equilibrium strategy,
Or
• (C2) Two or more players can set up one or more coalitions,
and some of them may change their Nash-equilibrium
strategies in order to increase their payoffs.
Consequently, what is usually seen as the essentially non-cooperative
nature of the game (2.1), turns out, when seen within the framework
of the Nash-equilibrium concept, to be based - even if tacitly and im-
plicitly - on the very strong cooperative assumption (C1) in the above
dichotomy.
On the other hand, in case (C1) is rejected, then the game falls out of
the Nash-equilibrium framework, and thus it opens up to the wealth
of possibilities under (C2), which among others, can contain a large
variety of possible ways of cooperation.
In this way, both the Nash-equilibrium concept and the Nash theo-
rem on the existence of the respective equilibrium in mixed strategies
are highly unstable or fragile when there are 3 or more players involved.
Also, similar with the best strategies in (2.3), with the Nash-equilibrium
strategies as well it can happen that they lead to payoffs which are
significantly lower than those that may be obtained by suitable coop-
eration.

As in the particular case of (2.1) which gives the von Neumann Min-
Max theorem on two person zero sum games, so with the weakened
concept of Nash-equilibrium in (2.4), such an equilibrium will in gen-
eral not exist, unless one embeds the pure strategy game (2.1) into its
extension given by the following mixed strategy game
20
(2.5) µG = (P, (µSi | i ∈ P ), (µHi | i ∈ P ))
Here, for i ∈ P , the set µSi has as elements all the probability dis-
tributions σi : Si −→ [0, 1], thus with Σsi∈Si σi(si) = 1. Let us now
denote
(2.6) µS =
∏
i∈P µSi
Then for i ∈ P we have the payoff function µHi : µS −→ R given by
(2.7) µHi(σ) = Σs∈S σ(s)Hi(s)
where for σ = (σi | i ∈ P ) ∈ µS and s = (si | i ∈ P ) ∈ S, we define
σ(s) =
∏
i∈P σi(si).
Now the definition (2.4) of Nash-equilibrium for pure strategy games
(2.1) extends in an obvious manner to the mixed strategy games (2.5),
and then, with the above we have, see Vorob’ev
Theorem ( Nash)
The mixed strategy extension µG = (P, (µSi | i ∈ P ), (µHi | i ∈ P ))
of every pure strategy game G = (P, (Si | i ∈ P ), (Hi | i ∈ P )), has
at least one Nash-equilibrium strategy.
Remark 4
Obviously, what was mentioned in Remarks 2 and 3 related to the
inevitability of cooperation when the pure strategy games (2.1) are
considered within the framework Nash equilibrium, will also hold for
the mixed strategy games (2.5), and thus as well for the above theorem
of Nash.
3. Usual Cooperation Models
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The idea behind the Nash Program to reduce cooperative games to
non-cooperative ones seems at first quite natural. Indeed, in its very
essence, a game means that, no matter what the rules of the game are,
each player must nevertheless remain with a certain residual freedom
to act within those rules, and be able to do so independently of the
other players involved. Therefore, it may appear that if we only con-
centrate on that freedom and independence, then within that context
one can see the game as non-cooperative, that being one of the usual
ways to understand the very meaning of freedom and independence.
Indeed, even if one cooperates, one is still supposed to be left in a
game with a certain freedom and independence. Thus it may still ap-
pear that, after subtracting all what is due to the rules of the game
and to one’s possible cooperation, one is still supposed to remain with
a certain freedom and independence.
Put in a simple formula, the Nash Program may appear as the state-
ment
game ≡ non-cooperative game ( modulo cooperation )
According to Nash himself, it could be possible to express all commu-
nication and bargaining in a cooperative game in a formal manner,
thus turn the resulting freedom and independence of the players into
moves in an extended non-cooperative game, in which the payoffs are
also extended accordingly. Since such a program has never been fully
implemented in all its details and only its ideas were presented, its crit-
icism must unavoidably remain on the same level, namely, of ideas.
However, a certain relevant and well tested objection can be made
nevertheless, see McKinsey [p. 359] :
” It is extremely difficult in practice to introduce into the
cooperative games the moves corresponding to negotia-
tions in a way which will reflect all the infinite variety
permissible in the cooperative game, and to do this with-
out giving one player an artificial advantage ( because of
his having the first chance to make an offer, let us say ).”
What is lost, however, in such a view as the Nash Program is that
an appropriate voluntary and mutual limitation of one’s freedom and
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independence, in order to implement a cooperation can significantly
change the payoffs, and thus it can offer to players an increase in their
payoffs, an increase which simply cannot be attained in any other non-
cooperative way. And this is after all the point in cooperation. This
is the basic fact which makes cooperation useful, and thus interesting
all in itself, and in particular, irreducible.
On the other hand, precisely to the extent that the above objection
in McKinsey is valid related to the Nash Program, and all subsequent
experience points to its validity, the very same objection touches es-
sentially as well on any attempt to reconsider cooperation, and do so
in more formal ways.
And then, the main issue when reconsidering cooperation is not so
much a renewed effort in trying to formalize its myriads of possibil-
ities, but rather, in first deciding to create and maintain a reliable
context of cooperation, and then starting from there, to develop in
various more typical and important instances certain appropriate the-
ories as well.
We shall now return to illustrate in a few simple examples the men-
tioned advantages of cooperation. And in two person nonzero sum
games cooperation is easier to consider since there is only one way for
it, namely, by the involvement of both, thus of all, players. In other
words, in terms of coalitions, see von Neumann & Morgenstern, in a
two person game there is only one possible coalition. Therefore we
start here with this simple case by recalling in its main features the
way such a cooperation was addressed in Nash [2], see also Luce &
Raiffa. A more general approach to the issue of cooperation is pre-
sented in section 5.
One of the most simple and dramatically clear examples which show
that there can be a most important point in cooperation even in the
case of such a simple situation as a two person nonzero sum game is
given by the Prisoner’s Dilemma which we present now in short.
Assume therefore that with the notation in (2.1), (2.2), we have P = { 1, 2 }
and S1 = S2 = { 1, 2 }, then H1 and H2 can be given by the double
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matrix
H1( 1, 1), H2( 1, 1) H1( 1, 2), H2( 1, 2)
H1( 2, 1), H2( 2, 1) H1( 2, 2), H2( 2, 2)
In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma this double matrix is given by
deny confess
deny − 1, − 1 − 20, 0
confess 0, − 20 − 8, − 8
and has the following meaning. The two prisoners are not allowed to
communicate with one another. If both confess to the crime they are
jointly accused of, then both get 8 years in prison. If both deny the
crime, then both get only 1 year in prison. Finally, if one denies and
the other confesses, then the one denying it gets 20 years in prison,
while the one confessing it is set free.
Clearly, in this case we have the respective strategy sets
S1 = S2 = { 1 = deny, 2 = confess }
and the game is symmetric with respect to the two players, as far as
their individual strategies and payoffs are concerned.
It is now obvious that for each player the best strategy in the sense
of (2.3) is to confess to the crime. Indeed, in such a case one will at
worst get 8 years in prison, and avoids a 20 years sentence which could
fall upon the one who denies the crime, while the other confesses to it.
However, precisely because of the symmetry of the situation, if both
choose their best strategies and confess, then both will stay 8 years
in prison, while had they cooperated and thus both denied the crime,
they would have each escaped with only 1 year in prison.
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This game thus shows immediately the following facts :
1. The best strategies in the sense of (2.3) do not always lead to the
best payoffs.
2. Cooperation can give better payoffs than the best strategies.
3. The best payoffs are not always available, not matter whether one
cooperates or not.
Of course, the Prisoner’s Dilemma can model a large variety of other
two person nonzero sum symmetric games which may have other pay-
off functions. Also, n ≥ 3 person variants of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
have been studied, see Axelrod.
Needless to say, with respect to cooperation a large variety of com-
plex issues arise even in such a simple case as that of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, see Axelrod. To mention just one such issue, let us note the
important difference it makes whether the game is played only once,
a fixed and known finite number of times, or a number of times which
is not known from the beginning. And clearly, in the last case, for
instance, the relevance of cooperation can only increase significantly.
Let us no turn to the axiomatic approach to bargaining, and thus to
one form of cooperation suggested by Nash. This approach is quite
typical for the period of late 1940s and early 1950s in game theory,
when the basic concepts of best strategies, respectively, equilibrium
were seen as being strongly related to certain principles of fairness,
plus possibly some suitable mathematical conditions, which together
would lead to the proper, if not even unique, definition of the respec-
tive concepts, see Rasmusen.
The axioms proposed by Nash were meant to be so natural, fair and
reasonable, as to impel the two players to accept them, thus establish-
ing the cooperation between them. In this way, such axioms belonged
to the meta-rational level of approach to game theory, and as such,
they were a good example for extending and deepening the concept
of cooperation. As it turned out, however, no matter how fair, rea-
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sonable and natural the axioms of Nash were, very simple examples
proved that in certain applications they would lead to strange, ques-
tionable, if not in fact, unacceptable outcomes. In this way, once again
it became obvious - even if at the time Nash suggested them, not as
clearly as from the later study of Binmore - that game theory, and
above all, the issue of cooperation, are extremely complex phenomena.
The versions of the two person nonzero sum games which Nash con-
sidered for cooperation or bargaining are given by a convex, closed and
bounded set H in R2 which describes all the possible outcomes for the
pairs of payoffs of the two players i ∈ P = { 1, 2 }, both of whom
are supposed to want to maximize their respective payoffs.
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✻player 2
✲ player 1
✉
h = (h1, h2) ∈ H
Namely, if the outcome of the game is the point h = (h1, h2) ∈ H
above, then player 1 receives a payoff of h1, while player 2 receives a
payoff of h2.
Remark 5
Clearly, since the set H of all the possible payoffs is in general an in-
finite set of points, thus of possible outcomes, the corresponding two
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person games cannot be in the pure strategy form (2.1), but rather
in the mixed strategy from (2.5). However, it is easy to see that not
all non-cooperative games in mixed strategy form (2.5) lead to a con-
vex set H of possible payoffs. Indeed, let us consider the following
two person nonzero sum non-cooperative game in pure strategy form
given by the double matrix
2, 1 − 1, − 1
− 1, − 1 1, 2
Then the corresponding mixed strategy form of this game will have
the set H of possible payoffs is given by, see Luce & Raiffa [p. 93]
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✻player 2
✲
player 1
(−1,−1)
③✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡
(1, 2)
③
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑✑ (2, 1)
③
③
A
A = (0.25, 0.25)
which is obviously not convex. Therefore, there are plenty of two per-
son nonzero sum non-cooperative games which, when taken even in
their mixed strategy form, cannot be contained in the Nash bargain-
ing or cooperative model.
However, even here, the advantages of cooperation already show up in
an obvious manner. For instance, in the above non-cooperative game,
the payoff pair (1.5, 1.5) is not available to the two players even in the
mixed strategy form, since it does not belong to the nonconvex set H .
Yet, by cooperating, the two players can easily reach this point (1.5, 1.5)
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which will give each of them the payoff 1.5. Indeed, this can be done
if they agree to go only for the payoffs (2, 1) and (1, 2), and do so with
equal frequency.
In general, it is easy to show that by cooperation, in every two person
mixed strategy game (2.5) it is possible to extend the initial and pos-
sibly nonconvex set H of payoff outcomes to its convex closure H#,
which in the case of the above game will look as follows
✻
player 2
✲
player 1
(−1,−1)
③✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡
(1, 2)
③
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑✑ (2, 1)
③❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
③(1.5, 1.5)
A similar extension of payoff outcomes to a closed convex set is possible
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through cooperation in the case of arbitrary n-person mixed strategy
games (2.5). Therefore, in this way they all enter within the Nash
bargaining or cooperation model.
Remark 6
In the particular case of a two person zero sum game in its mixed
strategy form, the convex set H has the simple form
H = { (x,−x) | a ≤ x ≤ b }
for certain a, b ∈ R, a ≤ b.

Let us now return to the Nash bargaining or cooperation model. Ac-
cording to the rules of the game, let us assume that the players can
secure the point h0 = (h 0 1, h 0 2) ∈ H given in the next figure,
In other words, completely independent of one another, player 1 can
make sure to receive at least h 0 1, and similarly, player 2 can be sure
to receive at least h 0 2.
The issue, therefore, is to what extent can the players improve on the
outcome h0 = (h 0 1, h 0 2) ∈ H by cooperation ?
In this regard, Nash suggested four axioms presented below, which
were supposed to impose themselves upon all rational players due to
their obviously fair and natural features, and thus set up a correspond-
ing cooperation between them. Let us therefore have a more detailed
look at what is happening, before we present the axioms.
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✻player 2
✲ player 1
h0 = (h0 1, h0 2)
✉
h = (h1, h2) ∈ H
✉ ✉ B
✉
A
✉ D
✉
C
With h0 = (h 0 1, h 0 2) ∈ H available even in the worst case, the
interest of the players is to cooperate in order to be able to move to
a better point h = (h1, h2) ∈ H , that is, for which both h1 ≥ h 0 1
and h2 ≥ h 0 2 hold, and which we shall denote in short by
(3.1) h0 = (h 0 1, h 0 2) ≤ h = (h1, h2)
Clearly, for the purpose of improving on h0, only the subset H
′ of H
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which is contained within the lines h0, A, C,B, h0 is of interest. Fur-
thermore, only the intersection H∗ of this subset H ′ with the so called
Pareto maximal subset of H is actually relevant. Here the Pareto
maximal subset is given by the line C,D, thus H∗ will result in the
line C,B. Indeed, for any other h = (h1, h2) ∈ H
′ there exists
h∗ = (h∗1, h
∗
2) ∈ H
∗ such that h∗1 ≥ h1 and h
∗
2 ≥ h2.
For convenience, let us recall that the Pareto maximal subset of any
set H in R2 is the set of nondominated points h = (h1, h2) in H , that
is, those which satisfy the condition
(3.2) h ≤ h′ ∈ H =⇒ h′ = h
Here we should recall that, in general, reducing the initial convex,
closed and bounded set H of payoffs to its Pareto maximal subset is
the concept of solution in a two person nonzero sum game which was
suggested by von Neumann & Morgenstern.
In case there is a guaranteed payoff h0 = (h 0 1, h 0 2) ∈ H , then
as above, the Pareto maximal subset of H can further be reduced to
what is denoted by H∗.
Such a solution concept, however, is not satisfactory due to the fol-
lowing two facts :
1. In general, the subset H∗ is not a single point, and it can contain
infinitely many points.
2. When the two players are reduced to choosing one point in H∗,
they face a situation in which there cannot be any cooperation.
Indeed, given any two different points a = (a1, a2), b = (b1, b2) ∈
H∗, a 6= b, we must have either
a1 < b1 and a2 > b2
or
a1 > b1 and a2 < b2
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Thus always one of the two players must end up worse by going
from a to b, or from b to a.
Remark 7
In the case of two person zero sum games, see Remark 6, we have
H∗ = H , that is, the whole of original set H of payoff outcomes is
the Pareto maximal set.
Fortunately, in this particular case, the celebrated 1928 Min-Max the-
orem of von Neumann can always yield a unique solution. However,
such games do not allow any cooperation, therefore they are outside
of the framework of the Nash bargaining or cooperation.

The problem which arose in the late 1940s was to find, at least in the
case of two person nonzero sum cooperative games, a solution concept
which would always deliver a unique solution, and thus go beyond the
solutions given by Pareto maximal sets.
And here the Nash axioms came to the fore in a rather obvious man-
ner. According to them, cooperation, or bargaining, is given by any
function F which depends on the convex, closed and bounded sets H
and the respective guaranteed payoffs h0 = (h 0 1, h 0 2) ∈ H , and
always has a corresponding unique value given by
h∗ = (h∗1, h
∗
2) = F (H, h0) ∈ H
a value called the Nash bargaining or cooperation solution, provided
that the following four axioms are satisfied :
Axiom of Pareto Maximality
h0 ≤ F (H, h0) = h
∗ = (h∗1, h
∗
2) ∈ H
∗
where above inequality means, see (3.1), the two inequalities, h 0 1 ≤ h
∗
1
and h 0 2 ≤ h
∗
2.
Axiom of Symmetry
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F (sym H, sym h0) = sym F (H, h0)
where sym : R2 −→ R2 is defined by sym(x, y) = (y, x).
Axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Given two convex subsets G ⊆ H ⊆ R2, then
h0, F (H, h0) ∈ G =⇒ F (G, h0) = F (H, h0)
In other words, if both the guaranteed payoff h0, and the Nash coop-
erative or bargaining solution F (H, h0) happen to belong to a smaller
convex set G ⊆ R2, then the solution F (G, h0) for that smaller set
remains the same with the original solution F (H, h0) for the larger set
H . Or equivalently, if from the original set H we leave out parts which
do not contain the guaranteed solution h0 and the solution F (H, h0),
then such an elimination does not affect the solution.
Finally, an axiom about the independence of changes of units in mea-
suring the payoffs.
Axiom of Scaling Invariance
Given any function scale : R2 −→ R2 such that scale(x, y) = (a +
bx, c + dy), with a, b, c, d ∈ R and b, d > 0, we have
F (scale H, scale h0) = scale F (H, h0)
The remarkable fact about the above four Nash axioms is presented
in
Theorem ( Nash)
There exists a unique function
(H, h0) 7−→ F (H, h0) = h
∗ = (h∗1, h
∗
2) ∈ H
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which satisfies the four Nash axioms, and thus it always gives the
unique Nash bargaining or cooperation solution.
Equivalently, the Nash bargaining or cooperation solution h∗ = (h∗1, h
∗
2)
is the unique point in H which satisfies the condition
(3.3) (h1 − h0 1)(h2 − h0 2) ≤ (h
∗
1 − h0 1)(h
∗
2 − h0 2)
for all h = (h1, h2) ∈ H, h ≥ h0.
In other words we have the following product maximization char-
acterization of the unique Nash bargaining or cooperation solution
h∗ = (h∗1, h
∗
2) ∈ H , namely
(3.4) max (h1 − h0 1)(h2 − h0 2) = (h
∗
1 − h0 1)(h
∗
2 − h0 2)
where the maximum is taken over all h = (h1, h2) ∈ H, h ≥ h0.
Remark 8
In Harsanyi there is an interpretation, going back to Zeuthen, of the
above characterization by product maximization of the unique Nash
bargaining or cooperation solution. Namely, let us assume that each
of the two players i ∈ P = { 1, 2 } has chosen a respective point
h∗ i = (h∗ i 1, h∗ i 2) in the Pareto maximal set H
∗. Further, let us
assume that h∗ 1 1, h∗ 2 2 > 0. Then in case
(3.5) (h∗ 1 1 − h∗ 2 1) / h∗ 1 1 ≤ (h∗ 2 2 − h∗ 1 2) / h∗ 2 2
it means that the relative loss to player 1, when giving up his or her
choice h∗ 1 and accepting instead the choice h∗ 2 of player 2, is not
larger than the relative loss to player 2 when switching from h∗ 2 to
h∗ 1. Thus in this case it is fair to expect player 1 to make the switch
either to the choice of player 2, or to a third choice which may give
a smaller relative loss to player 2. In case the opposite inequality
holds between the respective relative losses, then player 2 is expected
to switch. It follows that a choice which is acceptable to both players
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may emerge after an iteration which brings the above inequality and
it opposite as near as possible to equality.
However, we can note that the above inequality (3.5) is equivalent to
the inequality
(3.6) h∗ 1 1 h∗ 1 2 ≤ h∗ 2 1 h∗ 2 2
Now as noted, bargaining need not mean accepting the other player’s
offer. Instead, one can suggest a third point h∗ 3 = (h∗ 3 1, h∗ 3 2) in
H∗ such that the corresponding product h∗ 3 1 h∗ 3 2 is not less than
any of the the two products in (3.6). Thus the corresponding bar-
gaining iteration process can be seen as maximizing such products, as
happens in (3.4) in the Nash bargaining or cooperation model.
Remark 9
There have been a number of criticisms of the four Nash axioms, and
in particular, of the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives,
and also to some extent of the axiom of scaling invariance, as well as
of symmetry, see Luce & Raiffa [pp. 128-134].
Here for the sake brevity, we recall in short only one of the criticisms
of the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Let us consider the following pair of two person nonzero sum cooper-
ative games which are given respectively by the closed and bounded
convex sets
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✻player 2
✲
player 1
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊❊
①
100 ①
①
10
H1
①
(5, 50)
✻
player 2
✲
player 1
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊❊
①
50 ① ①
(5, 50)
①
10
H2
where the set H2 is obtained from H1 by cutting off the part above
the horizontal line at 50. In this case, both games have the same Nash
bargaining or cooperation solution given by
(3.7) h∗ = (h∗1, h
∗
2) = (5, 50)
which obviously satisfies as well the axiom of independence of irrele-
vant alternatives.
However, this situation in (3.7) can bring about the following objec-
tions :
1. Player 2 can claim to receive more in game H1 than in game H2,
since in game H1 he or she could in principle receive twice as
much as in game H2.
2. Conversely, player 1 can complain that player 2 should receive
less in game H2 than in game H1, since in game H2 the pos-
sibilities of player 2 were in principle diminished no less than
twice.
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And to add to the difficulties in accepting the four Nash axioms of
bargaining or cooperation, one should mention that even the axiom
of Pareto maximality, which at first may appear to be hardly at all
controversial, does in fact lead to significant difficulties, see Luce &
Raiffa [pp. 133, 134].
In this way, it becomes once again obvious that even at conceptual
levels, and even in the simplest possible cases, such as those of co-
operation which happen in two person games, there are considerable
difficulties involved.
4. Arrow’s Impossibility Result
As seen above, it is not a trivial task to manage within a rational
approach, such as game theory for instance, the typically conflicting
or competing objectives of a number of autonomous players. And one
of the difficulties may appear from the very beginning and at a fun-
damental level, namely, with finding suitable solution concepts which
take into account under reasonable and general enough conditions the
various individual objectives and possibilities involved.
For instance, as it happens with the Nash equilibrium, the respective
solution concept proves to overturn the alleged non-cooperative nature
of the games (2.1), (2.5). Also, in the Nash bargaining or coopera-
tion model, which only involves two players, what may appear to be
natural requirements about a solution do in fact lead to a variety of
obvious difficulties.
In this section, we consider briefly the situation in what is usually
called social, collective or group choice. The awareness about the
significant difficulty - even on the basic conceptual levels - in setting up
a reasonable aggregation of often conflicting or competing objectives
of autonomous agents has a longer history.
As mentioned, one of its cases, namely, the so called Voter’s Paradox,
dates back more than two centuries, and has been addressed by persons
like Condorcet, Laplace and Lewis Carroll, among others, see Mirkin.
One of the simplest forms of this paradox is as follows. Three voters
39
A, B and C have to rank in order of their own respective preferences
three alternatives a, b and c. The following situation can arise
A has the preferences a < b < c
B has the preferences b < c < a
C has the preferences c < a < b
In such a case each of the following preferences a < b, b < c and
c < a will be chosen by 2 out of the 3 voters, thus by a majority of
voters. And as often, in case the respective preference relation < is
transitive and not reflexive, thus it is a strict preference relation, then
we obviously face the paradox that a majority considers a < a. By
the same token, a majority will also consider b < b and c < c.
Needless to say, the appearance of a provable impossibility in any
branch of science tends to create a strong and long lasting impact.
And the existence of a rigorous mathematical proof for such an im-
possibility can only give further weight to such a result. Russell’s
paradox of 1901 in set theory, for instance, led to a long period of
important studies in the foundations of mathematics. The effects of
Go¨del’s 1931 impossibility result on formal systems in logic has its
reverberations still felt in mathematics.
Arrow’s 1950 impossibility result has become one of the most impor-
tant influences in group, social or collective choice theory. Interest-
ingly enough, Arrow’s first formulation in 1950 of that impossibility
proved to contain certain errors, as pointed out by Blau. However,
after suitable corrections, a somewhat weaker form of impossibility
could be reestablished, see Arrow [2]. And in fact, subsequently, a
whole range of related impossibility results has been developed, see
Kelly. We present here in a simple form the basic impossibility result
of Arrow, see Vincke [1], or Luce & Raiffa.
Let A be a finite set with at least three elements which represents all
the possible choices. We shall consider on A binary relations ≤ which
are transitive and complete, the latter meaning that for every a, b ∈ A,
we have at least one of the relations a ≤ b, a = b, or b ≤ a. For such a
binary relation ≤, we shall define the associated strict binary relation
<, where for a, b ∈ A we have a < b, if and only if a ≤ b and at the
40
same time we do not also have b ≤ a. Further, we denote by PA the
set of all such binary relations on A.
Let us assume now that there are n ≥ 3 autonomous individuals i,
each of whom can freely choose a binary relation ≤i from PA, which
expresses his or her preferences in the sense that, for a, b ∈ A, the
individual i prefers b to a, if and only if a ≤ b. In this way, we are
interested in the set
(4.1) P nA = PA × . . . × PA
where the Cartesian product contains n factors. Indeed, every n-tuple
(≤1, . . . ,≤n) ∈ P
n
A will be nothing else but the expression of one
possible case of the preferences of all the n individuals involved.
Now, an aggregation procedure is by definition any function
(4.2) f : P nA −→ PA
which associates to every n-tuple (≤1, . . . ,≤n) ∈ P
n
A expressing the
preferences of the n individuals, a group preference
≤ = f(≤1, . . . ,≤n) ∈ PA
on A. Clearly, the problem is that, typically, the n individual prefer-
ences
≤1, . . . ,≤n
may conflict, and therefore, their aggregation into a group preference
≤ = f(≤1, . . . ,≤n) ∈ PA
is not a trivial task, provided that such an aggregation intends to take
into account as much as possible all the n individual preferences. And
the natural way to do so is to require that the aggregation procedures
f to be used satisfy certain conditions which are seen to be fair.
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The conditions Arrow considered in this regard are the following three.
First is the
Unanimity Condition
(4.3)
∀ (≤1, . . . ,≤n) ∈ P
n
A, a, b ∈ A :
( a <i b for 1 ≤ i ≤ n ) =⇒ a < b
where ≤ = f(≤1, . . . ,≤n).
Second is the
Condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(4.4)
∀ (≤1, . . . ,≤n), (≤
′
1, . . . ,≤
′
n) ∈ P
n
A, a, b ∈ A :
( (≤1, . . . ,≤n) = (≤
′
1, . . . ,≤
′
n) on { a, b } ) =⇒
=⇒ ( ≤ = ≤′ on { a, b } )
where ≤ = f(≤1, . . . ,≤n) and ≤
′ = f(≤′1, . . . ,≤
′
n).
Finally, as the third one comes the
Condition on the Inexistence of a Dictator
which means that is none of the individuals i#, with 1 ≤ i# ≤ n en-
joys the property
(4.5)
∀ (≤1, . . . ,≤n) ∈ P
n
A, a, b ∈ A :
a <i# b =⇒ a < b
where ≤ = f(≤1, . . . ,≤n).
What follows is the celebrated impossibility result of Arrow, see Vincke
[1], Luce & Raiffa, Kelly, or Arrow [2]
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Theorem ( Arrow )
Suppose that the set A of possible choices has at least three elements,
and n ≥ 3, that is, there are at least three individuals.
Then there do not exist aggregation procedures f : P nA −→ PA in
(4.2) which satisfy the Unanimity and Independence conditions, and
are without a Dictator.
Remark 10
It is important, and also quite easy, to see that the crux of Arrow’s
impossibility is in the fact that the preferences ≤ in PA considered on
the set A are assumed to be not only complete, but also transitive.
Indeed, let us consider on A the larger set QA of binary relations on
A which need no longer be transitive, but only complete. Further, in-
stead of the original problem of finding an aggregation function (4.2),
let us consider the more general one of finding an aggregation function
(4.6) g : QnA −→ QA
Now, in view of the fact that the sought after aggregated preference
≤ = g(≤1, . . . ,≤n) ∈ QA need no longer be transitive, this ag-
gregation can be done very easily, for instance, according to majority
rule, like in the example of Condorcet. Namely, for a, b ∈ A, we can
simply define
(4.7) a ≤ b ⇔ car { i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a ≤i b } ≥ n/2
Then it follows easily that, indeed, ≤ ∈ OA, and furthermore, ≤ sat-
isfies all the three conditions (4.3) - (4.5) in Arrow’s theorem, namely,
the Unanimity Condition, the Condition of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives, and for n ≥ 3, also the Condition on the Inexistence of
a Dictator.
Remark 11
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It should be noted that in practical situations one can easily encounter
individual preferences which are not transitive. This can happen, for
instance, when such individual preferences result from multiple and
conflicting objectives, see Rosinger [3,4] and the literature cited there.
5. Further on Cooperation
In section 3, some of the main issues related to cooperation, its possi-
bilities and advantages were considered within game theory. Here, in
a similar manner, and in the case of social, collective or group choice,
several issues related to cooperation, its possibilities and advantages
are approached.
Clearly, one rather obvious rational way to overcome Arrow’s impos-
sibility, and do so without a recourse to a dictator, is by a cooperation
among the n autonomous individuals involved, cooperation aimed to
produce certain modifications of the preferences of some of them. Of
course, such modifications may be compensated by suitable side pay-
ments, just as it happens in games.
First, however, let us note that the number of possibilities for such
modifications in individual preferences - and thus for cooperation -
are indeed considerable, since what is involved in such modifications
is to move from the original set
(5.1) (≤1, . . . ,≤n) ∈ P
n
A
of n preferences of the respective individuals, to some other, this time
more or less commonly agreed upon new set of n individual preferences
(5.2) (≤′1, . . . ,≤
′
n) ∈ P
n
A
Indeed, when the move is made from the original individual preferences
in (5.1) to those in (5.2), not all n individuals need to effect modifica-
tions. Also, the modifications effectuated do not necessarily need the
agreement of everybody. Certainly, some such modifications of prefer-
ences can be made voluntarily, either by certain single individuals or
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by a number of them. And the motivation for such a modification in
one’s individual preferences can range over a large spectrum, possibly
including also the intent to avoid the introduction of a dictator.
In this way, the existence of the possibility for such a move in prefer-
ences - and thus for cooperation - is clearly there. Moreover, unlike
in games, it is also very clear, as well as simple what the n individuals
involved are supposed to do. Of course, as to how they are to effectu-
ate such a move in preferences, this remains just about as a complex
an issue, as it is in game theory.
Let us note here as a further argument supporting the possibility of
cooperation, the extremely large number of possibilities for a move in
individual preferences. Indeed, let us denote by N the number of ele-
ments in A, that is, the number of possible choices which each of the
n autonomous individuals have. Then it is obvious that
(5.3) car PA ≥ N !
hence
(5.4) car P nA ≥ (N ! )
n
Thus even in the case of, for instance, only 5 choices and 5 individuals,
the size of P nA is already larger than 10
10.
It follows that it is not particularly rational to neglect, disregard or
reject prior to the aggregation of preferences, the possibilities for co-
operation given by suitable modifications of the original individual
preferences in (5.1).
6. A Single Decision Maker with Multiple Conflicting Ob-
jectives
In view of the difficulties in games or social, collective and group
choices to manage conflict or competition, it may at first appear that,
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as mentioned, the process of making decisions by one single decision
maker may be so much more easy. And at first sight it may also ap-
pear that Arrow’s impossibility result would point in this direction.
In fact, as also mentioned, the case of one single decision maker, whom
we shall denote by SDM, can be seen as a game with one single player
who plays against Nature. Consequently, he or she can in a certain
sense function as a dictator to himself or herself.
What actually happens in such a situation is often contrary to such
a first perception. Namely, the whole range of complexities and diffi-
culties related to conflict, competition, cooperation, bargaining, side
payments, and so on, simply comes down as if crashing on the head
of that SDM, and thus become his or her internalized problems.
The one major difference is that in the case SDM behaves rationally,
the intention to cooperate is clearly there always, totally and uncondi-
tionally, since he or she is cooperating this time with no one else but
himself or herself. In this way, the case of such a SDM brings with it
the most auspicious context for cooperation. And then, the only issue
left, one that is not at all simple, is how to accomplish cooperation,
which now becomes but an issue of competence.
And as it turns out, this competence requires an understanding of the
nature of the conflicts involved in typical situations with multiple ob-
jectives, an understanding which can lead along less than usual, and
also somewhat counterintuitive directions of thinking and acting.
In this regard, two facts come to the fore from the beginning in typical
situations with multiple conflicting objectives, see Rosinger [3,4] :
• Fact 1. There is no, and there cannot be a unique natural
canonical candidate for the concept of solution. And in fact, the
very issue of choosing a solution concept leads to a meta-decision
problem which itself has multiple conflicting objectives.
• Fact 2. The information contained in the preference structures
involved, relative to all other possible, and for instance, non-
preference type information present in the situation, tends ex-
46
ponentially to zero, as the number of conflicting objectives in-
creases. This phenomenon, which in fact is of a very simple
nature related to the geometry of higher dimensional Euclidean
spaces, can be called the Principle of Increasing Irrelevance of
Preference Type Information, or in short PIIPTI, and it will be
proved in Appendix 1 at the end of this section. Its explicit
identification was first presented in Rosinger [4].
A further complication comes from the frequent phenomenon
that preferences, when they may be found and expressed, tend
not to be transitive.
What comes after the understanding of these two facts can be seen
as being, so far, a kind of ultimate exercise in cooperation, that is, in
solving the conflicts involved, and doing so within the context of the
rational behaviour assumed to hold on the part of the SDM.
Let us address briefly these two facts which, so far, do not seem to be
widely enough known.
When trying to solve the given decision problem with multiple con-
flicting objectives, the SDM may at first have to set up and solve
a meta-decision problem, namely, to choose an appropriate solution
concept for the initially given decision problem.
However, so often, the need for this first meta-decision stage is not re-
alized. And then, instead, one or another pet-solution concept which
happens to be familiar is applied to the decision problem, without
any due consideration whether that particular solution concept may,
or may not be appropriate.
In order to illustrate in some more detail what is involved, let us con-
sider the following large and practically important class of decision
making situations, when the SDM has to deal with n ≥ 2 typically
conflicting objectives given by the utility functions
(6.1) f1, . . . , fn : A −→ R
and his or her aim is to maximize all of them, taking into account
that most often such a thing is not possible simultaneously, due to the
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conflicts involved.
Here, as before, the set A describes the available choices, this time
those which the SDM has, and in this case A may as well be an infi-
nite set, for instance, some open or closed bounded domain in a finite
dimensional Euclidean space.
Clearly, the functions fi in (6.1) can be seen as utility functions, von
Neumann & Morgenstern, Luce & Raiffa, and as such, they generate
preference relations on the set of choices A. Namely, the preference re-
lation≤i corresponding to the utility function fi is defined for a, b ∈ A,
by
(6.2) a ≤i b ⇔ fi(a) ≤ fi(b)
Needless to say, the situation described by (6.1) is not the most gen-
eral one, since it is possible to encounter cases when the objectives
are not given by utility functions, or simply, are not even quantifiable.
However, the model in (6.1) can nevertheless offer an edifying enough
situation, in order to be able to obtain relevant insights into the na-
ture and extent of the complexities and difficulties which a SDM can
face. Furthermore, it can also lead to general enough solution meth-
ods, including ways to choose solution concepts, see Rosinger [3,4].
But to better illustrate the conundrum imposed upon a SDM, the
following age old analogy may be helpful in trying to describe his or
her problem :
”How to run after, and hunt down each of two or more
rabbits, and do so with one single gun with one single
bullet ?”
So much for the ... joys ... in the life of Arrow’s would be dictator
tuned here into a SDM ...
And now in view of the two facts mentioned above, let us indicate
some of the more important features involved which face a SDM.
First we note that, as we mentioned, the very concept of solution is not
at all clear. Indeed, there have been three traditional ways of dealing
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with the optimization of multiple objectives. Also, since the 1970s, a
number of other methods have been suggested. Often however, such
methods are not sufficiently compared with the already existing ones,
and instead, appear to be suggested as having a rather universal valid-
ity. Furthermore, such methods do not sufficiently take into account
the above mentioned two facts.
Let us now recall in short the three traditional methods in dealing
with conflicting objectives.
One of them is based on priorities. This method lists the objectives in
a certain order, and then tries to fulfill them as follows. First, the first
objective is maximized, then within the resources left, the second ob-
jective is maximized, and so on. Clearly, such an approach is based on
an up-front, instant, total, and often brutal, biased, or insufficiently
well considered elimination of conflict. And as such, it can easily lead
to most of the objectives, except for the first, and perhaps the very
few next ones, being left without any appropriate consideration.
The second method, aimed to improve on that of priorities, intro-
duces an additional, overall objective, which is constructed by a certain
weighted sum of the initial conflicting objectives, thus it is supposed to
take into account all of them. In this way, the conflict is again quite
up-front and totally eliminated, and the problem is reduced to the
optimization of one single objective, a problem which is rather trivial
in comparison.
The disadvantages of these two traditional methods of conflict reso-
lution have been repeatedly experienced in a large variety of practi-
cal situations. Chief among these disadvantages is the fact that both
methods lead to a far too early, simple and total elimination of conflict.
As a third attempt, aimed to go beyond such disadvantages was sug-
gested by Vilfredo Pareto, who introduced the concept of non-dominated
solution, see (3.2), which nowadays is also called a Pareto maximal
solution. This solution concept, with the help of suitable additional
analysis, such as for instance, trade-offs between various marginal util-
ities, was supposed to lead to optimal decisions.
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A deficiency of the Pareto solution concept is that, contrary to the
method of priorities or weighted objectives, it still leaves there, and
not properly dealt with, too much of the initial conflict, especially
when n ≥ 3, where n is the number of conflicting objectives involved,
see (6.1).
This is related to a property of finite dimensional Euclidean spaces
with larger dimensions, and it comes from the elementary, even if less
widely known geometric fact that spheres in such spaces have most of
their volume concentrated in a thin layer near to their surface, while
the whole rest of the interior of such spheres only contains a small
part of their volume. In fact, this increase in the relative volume of
the thin surface layer, when compared with the whole of the rest of
the volume, is exponential in the dimension of the respective sphere,
see Appendix 2 at the end of this section.
In other words
It is not worth buying ... higher dimensional water melons
...
And certainly, one should not peel ... higher dimensional
fruit ...
There is also a second, and yet simpler geometric argument leading
to the deficiency of the Pareto solution concept when the number
n of conflicting objectives is larger. This argument, as seen below,
concerns the relatively high dimension of the Pareto maximal, or non-
dominated sets.
Let us show now that within the model (6.1) of multiple conflicting ob-
jectives, when n ≥ 3, the use of the Pareto maximal, or non-dominated
sets as a solution concept does indeed leave too much of the conflict
unsolved, as far as the reduction in dimensions is concerned. Indeed,
let us denote by
(6.3) B = { (f1(a), . . . , fn(a)) | a ∈ A } ⊆ R
n
the set of n-tuples of outcomes (f1(a), . . . , fn(a)) ∈ R
n which corre-
spond to various choices a ∈ A which the SDM can make. Typically,
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this is a bounded and closed subset in Rn, similar to what happens,
when n = 2, in the case of two person nonzero sum non-cooperative
games, see section 3.
Let us now consider the Pareto maximal, or non-dominated subset of
B, which will be given by
(6.4) BP = { b ∈ B | ∀ c ∈ B : b ≤ c =⇒ c = b }
where, as in (3.1), here correspondingly in general, for b = (b1, . . . , bn), c =
(c1, . . . , cn) ∈ R
n, we denote
(6.5) b ≤ c
if and only if bi ≤ ci, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Now, it is often the case that the set B of outcomes has a nonvoid
interior, and thus it is an n-dimensional subset of Rn. Consequently,
the Pareto maximal subset BP is an (n-1)-dimensional subset of B.
In this way, by using the solution concept of Pareto maximal or non-
dominated subsets, all what is done is to go from a set B with n
dimensions to a subset of it which still has n − 1 dimensions. And
while in the case of n = 2, that is, of only two conflicting objectives,
this reduces the dimension by half, on the other hand, when n ≥ 3,
the relative reduction in dimension is merely 1 / n, thus it becomes
less and less relevant, as n may increase.
In conclusion, the solution concept given by the Pareto maximal or
non-dominated subset may be useful in the case of n = 2 conflict-
ing objectives, similar to what happened with the Nash bargaining or
cooperative solution, see section 3. However, as n increases, starting
with n = 3, this solution concept leaves more and more of the conflict
unresolved, since both the relative volume and relative dimension of
the Pareto maximal, or non-dominated sets become higher, as n may
increase.
Let us return now again to the above mentioned Fact 1, according to
which prior to solving the multiple conflicting decision making prob-
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lem in (6.1), the SMD may have to solve a meta-decision problem
which itself may have multiple conflicting objectives. Namely, the
SDM may have to decide upon a solution concept which he or she will
use in solving the initial problem in (6.1). In this regard, as mentioned
in Rosinger [3,4] and the literature cited there, several meta-objectives
concerning possible solution concepts have been put forward. Among
them are :
1. Ease in finding the solution to (6.1).
2. Fidelity in modelling the conflict in (6.1) when n ≥ 2.
3. Confidence in the relevance of the solution obtained.
4. Use not only of preference type information, but of other possible
information, such as for instance, indifference.
Further, in order to satisfy such meta-objectives about solution con-
cepts, since the late 1970s a number of interactive methods have been
developed for the solution of (6.1), see Rosinger [3,4] and the literature
cited there.
It is important to note here that, as argued next, such interactive
methods lead to a new class of so called interactive solution concepts,
which are beyond the traditional ones that were only giving what can
be considered as being a priori solution concepts.
Indeed, in such interactive methods the corresponding solution con-
cepts presented to the SDM do not merely lead to input-output, black-
box type algorithms, which the SDM can only use by introducing the
data about (6.1), and then having to wait passively until the result is
obtained at the output.
Instead, the SDM can during the execution of the algorithm interact
with it, in order to provide further information on, or make certain
partial decisions about the conflicts involved in (6.1).
In this way, one may add to the above meta-objectives the following
one as well :
5. Ease, efficiency and effectiveness in the interaction process.
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Details about such interactive solution concepts can be found in Rosinger
[3,4], and the literature cited there.
What is remarkable in the above, related to decision making with mul-
tiple conflicting objectives, is that everything rational done in this re-
spect can be seen as an instance of cooperation aimed to deal properly
with the conflicts involved. This includes the meta-decision problem
itself, which tries to identify a solution concept, as well as the inter-
active type solution concepts.
On the other hand, since only one rational agent, that is, the SDM
is involved, it may happen that - due to the lack of presence of, and
challenge from other rational agents - the SDM may not always pursue
consistently enough the ways of cooperation, in spite of the fact that
he or she is unreservedly cooperation minded.
And the extent to which cooperation is possible has most likely not
yet been figured out satisfactorily. One indication in this regard can
be given, for instance, by the lack of a wide enough awareness about
Fact 1 and Fact 2 mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Appendix 1
We start with a very simple geometric fact about finite dimensional
Euclidean spaces which can give a good insight into the more general
result in (6.8).
On the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn, with n ≥ 1, we con-
sider the natural partial order relation ≤ defined for elements x =
(x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ R
n, according to, see (6.5)
x ≤ y ⇔ xi ≤ yi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Let us denote by
Pn = { x ∈ R
n | x ≥ 0 }
the set of nonnegative elements in Rn, corresponding to the partial
order ≤.
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Then we can note that, for n = 1, the set P1 is half of the space
R
1 = R.
Further, for n = 2, the set P2 is a quarter of the space R
2.
And in general, for n ≥ 1, the set Pn is 1 / 2
n of the space Rn.
It follows that in an n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn, if one is given
an arbitrary element x ∈ Rn, then the probability for this element x
to be nonnegative is 1 / 2n, thus it tends exponentially to zero with n.
Consequently, the same happens with the probability that two arbi-
trary elements x, y ∈ Rn are in the relationship x ≤ y, since this is
obviously equivalent with the condition y − x ≥ 0.
This means that, when the number n ≥ 2 of conflicting objectives
increases, one can expect a similar trend to happen with preference
relations on the set of outcomes in (6.3), which correspond to the n
conflicting objectives in (6.1), that phenomenon being at the root of
PIIPTI formulated in Fact 2 above. A respective result in this regard
is presented in (6.8) in the sequel.
Let us now assume that in (6.1) we have a finite set of choices, namely
(6.6) A = { a1, . . . , am }, m ≥ 2
A natural single preference relation on A corresponding to (6.1), and
which may try to synthesize the respective n conflicting objectives, is
given by a subset
(6.7) S ⊆ A× A
Here, for any a, a ′ ∈ A, the SDM will prefer a ′ to a, in which
case we write a ≤ a ′, or equivalently, (a, a ′) ∈ S, if and only if
one has for each objective function fi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, either that
fi(a
′) − fi(a) > 0 and it is not negligible, or |fi(a
′) − fi(a)| is
negligible.
One can note that the method of weighted sums also leads to such a
single preference relation S for the SDM, while the method of priorities
does in fact just about the same. Of course, in these two latter cases
the resulting preferences may be quite different from that in (6.7), as
well as from one another.
Obviously, there is a strong tendency to think that the SDM could
solve the problem based on such, or some similar, one single prefer-
ence relation S which he or she may be able to find, such a tendency
being not in the least a consequence of Arrow’s impossibility result.
And needless to say that such a thinking comes mainly from the fact
that there has not been a long and sophisticated enough tradition,
and therefore experience, in dealing with multiple conflicting objec-
tives. Instead, in such conflict situations there has traditionally been,
as mentioned, a tendency simply to eliminate the conflict too soon,
and thus necessarily in highly questionable ways.
And certainly, when n = 1, that is, when in (6.1) there is only one
single objective, the whole information is already given in one single
corresponding preference relation S, and thus it is enough to solve the
problem. However, such a problem with n = 1 is so simple that it is
no longer a problem of multiple conflicting objective decision making.
Let us therefore see more precisely how much information one single
preference relation S can carry, when the number n of conflicting ob-
jectives in (6.1) becomes larger, and even if only moderately so. This
can be done quite easily by noting that in typical situations, we can
have the relation
(6.8) car S / car (A×A) = O(1 / 2n)
where for a finite set E we denoted by ”car E” the number of its ele-
ments.
The proof of (6.8) goes as follows, by using a combinatorial-probabilistic
type argument. Let us take any injective function g : A −→ R, and
denote by
(6.9) Sg = { (a, a
′) ∈ A× A | g(a) ≤ g(a ′) }
which is its corresponding preference relation on A. Then obviously
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(6.10) car Sg = m(m+ 1) / 2
Now given any subset S ⊆ A × A, let us denote by P (S) the proba-
bility that for an arbitrary pair (a, a ′) ∈ A × A, we have (a, a ′) ∈ S.
Then clearly
(6.11) P (Sg) = (1 + 1 / m) / 2
Let us assume now about the objective functions in (6.1) the following
(6.12) f1, . . . , fn are injective
and their corresponding sets of preferences
(6.13) Sf1 , . . . , Sfn are probabilisitically independent
Then we obtain, see (6.11)
(6.14) P (Sf1
⋂
. . .
⋂
Sfn) = P (Sf1) . . . P (Sfn) = (1+1 / m)
n / 2n
And now (6.8) follows, provided that n in (6.1) and m in (6.6) are
such that
(6.15) (1 + 1 / m)n = O(1)
which happens in many practical situations.
As for the independence condition (6.13), let us note the following. Let
us assume that the objectives f1 and f2 are such that for a, a
′ ∈ A
we have
(6.16) f1(a) < f1(a
′) ⇔ f2(a) < f2(a
′)
then obviously Sf1 = Sf2 , hence (6.14) may fail. But clearly, (6.16)
means that Sf1 and Sf2 are not independent. In the opposite case,
when
(6.17) f1(a) < f1(a
′) ⇔ f2(a
′) < f2(a)
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then obviously
(6.18) Sf1
⋂
Sf2 = { (a, a) | a ∈ A }
and (6.14) may again fail. However (6.18) once more means that Sf1
and Sf2 are not independent, since they are in total conflict with one
another.
Appendix 2
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the set B of outcomes in
(6.3) is of the form
(6.19) B =
{
b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ R
n
∣∣∣ b1, . . . , bn ≥ 0
b1 + . . . + bn ≤ L
}
for a certain L > 0. Then clearly the Pareto maximal subset of B is
(6.20) BP = { b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ R
n | b1 + . . . + bn = L }
Now for 0 < ǫ < L, the ǫ-thin shell in B corresponding to BP is given
by
(6.21) BP (ǫ) =
{
b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ R
n
∣∣∣ L− ǫ ≤ b1 + . . . + bn ≤
≤ L
}
A standard multivariate Calculus argument gives for the volume of B
in (6.19) the relation
(6.22) vol B = Kn L
n
where the constant Kn > 0, involving the Gamma function, does only
depend on n and not on L as well. In this way it is easy to see that
(6.23) vol BP (ǫ) / vol B = 1− (1− ǫ / L)n
This shows, for instance, that in the 20-dimensional case, a shell with
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a thickness of only 5% of the radius L will nevertheless contain at least
63% of the total volume.
In more simple and direct geometric terms the relation (6.23) means
that :
( VOL ) ”The volume of a multidimensional solid is
mostly concentrated next to its surface.”
It may be instructive to note that relation (6.23) also has a physi-
cal interpretation, as it explains the phenomenon of temperature, see
Manin. Indeed, let us assume that a certain simple gas has n atoms
of unit mass. Then their kinetic energy is given by
(6.24) E = Σ1≤i≤n v
2
i / 2
where vi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are the velocities of the respective atoms.
Therefore, for a given value of the kinetic energy E, the state of the
gas is described by the vector of n velocities, namely
(6.25) v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Sn(
√
(2E))
where for L > 0, we denoted by
(6.26) Sn(L) = { x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n | x21+ . . . +x
2
n = L
2 }
the ( n - 1 )-dimensional surface of the n-dimensional ball with radius
L in Rn.
Now we can recall that in view of the Avogadro number, under normal
conditions for a usual macroscopic volume of gas, one can have
(6.27) n > 1020
Therefore, the above property ( VOL ) which follows from (6.23) is
very much manifest. Let us then assume that a small thermometer
with a thermal energy e negligible compared to E is placed in the gas.
Then the state (6.25) of the gas will change to a new state
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(6.28) v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Sn(
√
(2E ′))
However, in view of property ( VOL ), it will follow with a high prob-
ability that
(6.29) E ′ ≈ E
And it is precisely this stability or rigidity property (6.29) which leads
to the phenomenon of temperature as a macroscopically observable
quantity.
7. Conclusions
Situations involving the actions of conscious rational agents who aim
to optimize certain outcomes are approached in three mathematical
theories, namely, the theory of games, the theory of social, collective
or group choice, and decision theory. In games, there are two or more
such conscious and rational agents, called players, who are interacting
according to the given rules. And except for that, they are free and
independent, and there is no overall authority who could influence
in any way the players. In social, collective or group choice, again,
there are two or more conscious and rational agents with their given
individual preferences. Here however, the issue is to find a mutually
acceptable aggregation of those preferences. And such an aggregation
is seen as being done by an outsider. Finally, decision theory can be
seen as a game in which a conscious rational agent plays against Na-
ture.
Cooperation is usually seen as pertaining rather exclusively to games.
Due to the extreme complexities involved, however, a systematic, deep
and far reaching enough study of cooperation has not yet been accom-
plished within game theory.
Although in ways not entirely identical with those in games, cooper-
ation can take place as well in situations of social, collective or group
choice. And here, ever since the celebrated 1950 Arrow impossibil-
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ity result, there is a strong motivation for implementing cooperation,
since the alternative in general is the introduction of a dictator.
One of the main sources of the extreme complexities related to co-
operation in games and in social, collective or group choice is in the
presence of two or more conscious and rational agents. And as seen in
Binmore [1-3], such a presence in games can already take things well
beyond the reach of any algorithmic approach, even if cooperation is
not among the main issues pursued. Also, in social, collective or group
choice, the only way to overcome the extreme complexities created by
the presence of three or more individual preferences is by the intro-
duction of a dictator, as proved in the mentioned result of Arrow.
Yet the presence of such extreme complexities related to cooperation
need not lead to a situation where one has in fact given up completely
and for good on the study and implementation of cooperation, espe-
cially if this giving up has happened rather by default.
In the case of one single decision maker, who in decision theory is seen
as a conscious rational player, playing alone against Nature, one may
seem at first two have a situation which enjoys all the advantages that
are missing both in games, and in social, collective or group choice.
Indeed, it may at first appear that such a single decision maker does
not have to put up with one or more other autonomous agents. And
also, as the single player, he or she can automatically be seen as a
dictator as well, since there is no other conscious agent out there to
protest and actively oppose, least of all what is called Nature in such
a context.
It would, therefore, appear that in decision theory one has it very easy,
and in particular, one has no need to consider cooperation, since in
the first place, there is no other conscious agent to cooperate with.
And yet, in the typical practical situations when the single decision
maker is facing multiple and conflicting objectives, all the mentioned
seeming advantages are instantly cancelled. Instead, the single deci-
sion maker can easily end up feeling as if two or more autonomous
agents have moved inside of him or her, and now he or she has to turn
into a dictator who, in fact, ends up fighting himself or herself.
The obvious way out, therefore, for the single decision maker is to set
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up certain forms of cooperation or bargaining between his or her mul-
tiple and conflicting objectives. And as seen in section 6, this again is
far from being a trivial task. Yet, the advantage remains that there
is only one single conscious and rational agent involved, namely, the
decision maker, and therefore, there is only one person to convince
about the advantages of specific ways of cooperations.
And in fact, in this case there is no need to convince anybody about
the critical importance and usefulness of cooperation.
In this way, cooperation can be seen as being highly pertinent to all
the three theories of games, choice and decision. And in some ways,
cooperation may be more at home, even if not at ease as well, in de-
cisions.
What is suggested in this study is, therefore, to face consciously the
following alternative :
Non-cooperation : Either we limit rationality and try to use it as
much as possible within the framework of non-cooperation, and only
on occasion, and only as a second choice do we try cooperation as well.
Or
Cooperation : Within an extended and deeper sense of rationality,
in fact, a meta-rationality, we create and maintain a context in which
the priority given to cooperation can be relied upon. In other words,
we are firmly and reliably cooperation minded.
So far, the first alternative has mostly been taken, even if rather by
default. In games, as follows from Binmore, this limitation of ratio-
nality mostly to the study of non-cooperative games is still leaving us
with complexities which are not algorithmically solvable. Thus, hav-
ing mostly avoided what appeared a theoretically difficult task in the
second alternative, instead of it, the first alternative, which in fact is
not less difficult, was taken in game theory. In social, collective or
group choice, as seen in section 5, there are immense possibilities for
cooperation, while the alternative is the introduction of a dictator.
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And as far as decision theory is concerned, what may be somewhat
surprising, it proves to be a rather natural and also unavoidable, even
if not at all easy, framework for cooperation.
The way, therefore, suggested in this study is to take the second above
alternative, namely, of cooperation.
Here we have to keep in mind that both the non-cooperative and co-
operative types of games are of an extreme complexity from the point
of view of theoretical approaches. And similar extreme difficulties we
face in social, collective or group choice, as well as in decisions.
Therefore, the focus can now shift away from the earlier attempts
to construct comprehensive enough theories of cooperation for either
of the three theories of games, choice or decisions. Instead, one can
focus on finding corresponding cooperation minded frameworks which
are large enough to contain much of what is already known and it is
important about cooperation, and then, in such frameworks, to de-
velop further theories, methods, examples, applications, and so on,
related to cooperation, which have their own value and interest, even
if they may fall short of being comprehensive enough.
And clearly, once such a shift of focus is found appropriate, the second
alternative is the natural one. Indeed, this second alternative does ob-
viously contain the first one as a particular case. On the other hand,
the first one - in spite of the Nash Program, among others - has so far
not been proven to contain the second one.
So far, because of various reasons, not all of them fully conscious and
rational, and some of them related to the significant complexities in-
volved in both theoretical and practical aspects of cooperation, there
has been a tendency to pursue the first above alternative. However,
as seen in this study, there are very strong reasons to opt firmly and
reliably for the second alternative above, namely, of cooperation. In-
deed, in games, even the paradigmatic non-cooperative Nash equilib-
rium loses all meaning outside of certain very strong cooperative type
assumptions. In social, collective or group choice, the failure to coop-
erate must bring in a dictator. And in decision making with multiple
conflicting objectives, the need for, and advantages of cooperation do
not have to be argued, the only issue being a satisfactory competence
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in this regard.
References
[1] Arrow, Kenneth J [1] : A difficulty in the concept of social welfare.
Journal of Political Economy, 58, 4 (1950)
[2] Arrow, Kenneth J [2] : Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd
ed. Wiley, New York, 1963
[3] Axelrod, R : The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, Basic
Books, 1984
[4] Bacharach, Michael & Hurley Susan (Eds) : Foundations of De-
cision Theory, Blackwell, Cambridge, 1991
[5] Binmore, Kenneth [1] : Modelling rational players. Part I. Eco-
nomics and Philosophy, 3 (1987) 179-214
[6] Binmore, Kenneth [2] : Modelling rational players. Part II. Eco-
nomics and Philosophy, 4 (1988) 9-55
[7] Binmore, Kenneth [3] : Game theory and the social contract :
Mark II (manuscript 1988) London School of Economics
[8] Blau, Julian : The existence of social choice functions. Econo-
metrica, 25, 2 (1957) 302-313
[9] Hargreaves, Shaun P, et. al. : Game Theory, A Critical Intorduc-
tion. Routledge, London, 1995
[10] Harsanyi, J C : Approaches to the bargaining problem before
and after the theory of games : a critical discussion of Zeuthen’s,
Hick’s, and Nash’s theories. Econometrica, 24 (1956), 144-157
[11] Kelly, Jerry S : Arrow Impossibility Theorems. Acad. Press, New
York, 1978
63
[12] Luce, R Duncan & Raiffa, Howard : Games and Decisions, Intro-
duction and Critical Survey. Wiley, New York, 1957, or Dover,
New York, 1989
[13] Manin, Yu I : Mathematics and Physics. Birkhauser, Boston, 1981
[14] McKinsey, J C C : Introduction to the Theory of Games. Mc-
Graw-Hill, New York, 1952
[15] Mirkin, Boris G : Group Choice. Wiley, New York, 1979
[16] Nasar, Silvia : A Beautiful Mind. Faber and Faber, London, 1998
[17] Nash, John F [1] : Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc.
Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 38 (1950), 48-49
[18] Nash, John F [2] : The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18
(1950) 155-162
[19] Nash, John F [3] : Non-cooperative games. Ann. Math., 54 (1951)
286-295
[20] Nash, John F [4] : Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica,
21 (1953) 128-140
[21] von Neumann, John : Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Math.
Annalen, 100 (1928) 295-320
[22] von Neuman, John & Morgenstern, Oskar : Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior. Princeton, 1944
[23] Owen, Guillermo : Game Theory. Saunders, Philadelphia, 1968
[24] Pareto, Vilfredo : Course d’e´conomie politique professe´ a`
l’universite´ de Lausanne, 3 volumes, 1896-7
[25] Rasmusen, Eric : Games and Information. Balckwell, Malden,
2001
[26] Rosinger, Elemer E [1] : Interactive algorithm for multiobjective
optimization. JOTA, 35, 3 (1981) 339-365
64
[27] Rosinger, Elemer E [2] : Errata Corrige : Interactive algorithm
for multiobjective optimization. JOTA, 38, 1 (1982) 147-148
[28] Rosinger, Elemer E [3] : Aids for decision making with conflicting
objectives. In Serafini, P (Ed.), Mathematics of Multiobjective
Optimization. Springer, New York, 1985, 275-315
[29] Rosinger, Elemer E [4] : Beyond preference information based
multiple criteria decision making. European Journal of Opera-
tional Research, 53 (1991) 217-227
[30] Tucker, Albert W : A two person dilemma. (unpublished) Stan-
ford University mimeos, May 1950.
[31] Vincke, Philippe [1] : Aggregation of preferences : a review. Eu-
ropean Journal of Operational Research, 9 (1982) 17-22
[32] Vincke, Philippe [2] : Arrow’s theorem is not a surprising result.
European Journal of Operational Research, 10 (1982) 22-25
[33] Vorob’ev, N N : Game Theory, Lectures for Economists and Sys-
tems Scientists. Springer, New York, 1978
[34] Walker, Paul : An outline of the history of game theory.
(http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/class/histf.html)
[35] Zeuthen, F : Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare.
Routledge, London, 1930
Note : References [3], [4], [9], [11], [12], [15], [16], [22], [23], [28], [29],
[33] and [34] are particularly instructive for those who wish to become
familiar with the subjects in this study. References [11], [12], [15], [22]
and [23] are still some of the very best of their kind.
65
